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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID S. GROW, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MARWICK DEVELOPMENT, INC., a 
corporation; DANIEL R. SOUTHWICK; 
STERLING MARTELL; et al., 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
BOARDWALK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
No. 16675 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS BOARDWALK DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION AND PHOENIX DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by Appellant David S. Grow to 
obtain an Order declaring that all of Respondents' right, 
title and interest in and to real property, together with 
a downpayment in the amount of $75,000 and installment 
payments in the amount of $8,739.20, be forfeited. This 
action centers upon the interpretation of a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The Trial Court granted Summary Judgment in 
favor of Respondent Boardwalk Development Corporation, 
ruling that Boardwalk had a valid and existing interest in 
the property which was subject to a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. The Court held that any alleged default on the 
Contract was timely cured--except for a slight difference 
in calculation--and that under these circumstances, 
forfeiture constituted a penalty. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek the following relief on appeal: 
1. That the Amended Judgment of the Trial Court 
be affirmed and that Respondents be allowed to continue 
with their purchase of the property pursuant to a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. 
2. Alternatively, Respondents seek an Order 
from this Court affirming the Trial Court's ruling that 
forfeiture imposes a penalty upon Respondents and remand· 
ing the case to the Trial Court for an accounting of the 
exact sum due and payable to Appellant as of the date of 
the attempted forfeiture. Respondents should be granted a 
reasonable time to pay to Appellant any sum determined 
owing. 
- 2 -
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents Boardwalk Development Corporation 
and Phoenix Development Corporation object to Appellant's 
State;nent of Facts upon the grounds that Appellant has 
misrepresented facts and has omitted material information 
which casts certain remaining facts in a false light. 
Respond en ts submit the following facts to supplement 
those provided by Appellant: 
A. l_de.Q_.E_i_f ica.E_ion_.9.!._Par t ies_and Con.E_~ct~. 
1. This action involves a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, dated October 8, 1977 (herein "Contract") for 
the purchase and sale of property situated in Provo, Utah. 
The total sales price was $280,000. 
2. Plaintiff-Appellant David S. Grow (herein 
"Grow") is the Seller pursuant to the Contract. Grow is 
purchasing the property on a contract from Ariel Davis, 
which contract, as of August 1, 1977, had an outstanding 
balance of approximately $175,000 (R. 6, Paragraph 6). 
3. Defendants-Respondents Marwick Development, 
Inc., a corporation, Daniel R. Southwick and Sterling 
Martell are the Buyers pursuant to the Contract (herein 
collectively "Marwick"). 
4. Defendant-Respondent Boardwalk Development 
Corporation (herein "Boardwalk") entered into a contract 
- 3 -
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dated September 15, 1978, with Marwick for the purchase of 
purchase price was $400,000 (R. is 41 , the property. The 
Boardwalk intervened as a party-defendant in this action 
( R. 223). 
5. Defendant-Respondent Phoenix Development 
Corporation (herein "Phoenix") purchased the interest of 
Daniel R. Southwick in the Contract and was substituted as 
a party-defendant herein in place of Mr. Southwick (R, 
226). 
8. Operative Facts 
On or about October 8, 1977, Grow and Marwick 
entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract (herein 
"Contract") (R. 6, 7). The property subject to the 
Contract was located in Provo, Utah. The total sales 
price was $280,000. The Contract was drafted by Grow's 
agent (R. 175, Paragraph 3). 
$75,000. 
Marwick's downpayment for the property was 
$28,000 was paid to Grow pursuant to the Con· 
tract and $47 ,000 was received by Grow pursuant to an 
h A t ( R 3 6 120) The property remained Exe ange greemen . , , . 
encumbered by a $175,000 obligation of Grow in favor of 
Ariel Davis leaving Grow an apparent equity of $30 ,000 (R. 
6). 
- 4 -
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The payment provisions of the Contract provide 
as follows: 
3 .... $205,000 plus accrued interest shall 
be paid in monthly installments of $1,747.44 
until the balance is paid in full. Said payments 
are to commence on September 1, 1977, and each 
subsequent month to be due and payable on the 
_first day of each month. (Emphasis added.) 
Paragraph llB of the Contract provides: 
At any time and for whatever length of time 
this contract may be delinquent or in default by 
Buyer, for any reason the interest rate on all 
amounts unpaid under this contract shall in-
crease to eighteen percent (18%) per annum. 
(Emphasis added.) 
As of April 14, Marwick had made payments 
totalling $8,739.20 representing the five (5) installment 
payments owing pursuant to Paragraph 3 of the Contract (R. 
120, 121, 122). 
Marwick failed to make the May 1, June 1, July 1 
and August 1, 1978 payments in a timely manner ( R. 70). 
Grow informed Marwick by written notices dated 
May 15, 1978, and June 16, 1978, of its alleged defaults 
under the Contract and that it was in default in the 
following particulars: 
1. Failure to pay reasonable attorney's 
fees in the amount of $80.00. 
2. Failure to pay "delinquent charges 
under Paragraph llB of the Contract" in an unspeci-
f ied amount. 
- 5 -
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3. Failure to pay the "May 1, 1978, 
Contract payment." 
4. Failure to pay the "June 1, i 978 / 
Contract payment" (R. 87, 88, 90, 91). 
Grow delivered to Marwick a written notice 
dated July 14, 1978, purporting to forfeit Marwick's 
interest in the property (R. 97). 
Subsequent to its earlier Notice of Forfeiture, 
and apparently as a result of defects in earlier noti-
ces, Grow delivered another Notice of Default dated August 
9, 1978, specifically allowing Marwick fifteen (15) days 
within which to cure the default under the Contract (R. 
92). This notice for the first time itemized the "delin· 
quent charges under the Contract" and sought an incredible 
$21,750.36 in addition to the amounts already paid (R 95). 
At the time the Notice of Default was sent, only nine (91 
payments of $1,747.44 each had matured pursuant to Para· 
graph 3 of the Contract. Marwick had paid five (5) of 
these installments (R. 120, 121, 122). The Notice of 
Cefault provided that in the event Marwick failed to 
remedy its default, Grow would not convey the property and 
all payments made by Marwick "would be forfeited" (R. 9l, 
9 3) • 
after 
On or about August 22, 1978--thirteen days 
the Notice of Default--Marwick tendered to Grow 
- 6 -
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central Bank and Trust Cashier's Check No. 117363 in the 
amount of $7,394.00. This check represented monthly 
payments for May, June, July and August of $1,747.44, 
together with eighteen percent (18%) interest thereon and 
attorney's fees in the amount of $300.00 (R. 37, 122). 
This check was held by Grow until October 13, 1978, at 
which time it was returned to Marwick (R. 37, 122). 
Subsequent to Marwick' s tender and while retain-
ing the Cashier's Check, Grow served Marwick with a Notice 
of Forfeiture. On September 1, 1978, this Notice was 
personally served upon Marwick, together with a Complaint 
and Amended Complaint ( R. 30, 31, 32). Curiously, the 
Complaint had been filed on July 18, 1978, but never 
served. 
On September 18, 1978, Marwick entered into a 
Contract with Boardwalk for the sale of the property. The 
purchase price was $400,000 (R. 151). 
Grow retained Marwick tender until October 
13, 1978--approximately one month after the Boardwalk 
Contract was executed and Boardwalk's Notice of Interest 
was recorded--at which time it was returned to Marwick. 
Marwick promptly tendered to the Registry of the Court the 
Cashier's Check, together with the monthly payments on the 
Contract which were due (R. 37). 
- 7 -
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Grow filed a Notice of Lis Pendens on No 
vember 
9, 1978, approximately two months after the Boardwalk 
Contract was executed and four months after the lawsuit 
was commenced (R. 45). At the time Boardwalk entered into 
its Contract, no Lis Pendens was recorded. 
On April 12, 1979, Boardwalk was allowed to 
intervene as a party-defendant and Phoenix was substituted 
as a defendant in place of Daniel R. Southwick (R. 223, 
226). 
Boardwalk promptly moved for summary judgment 
in its favor that Grow' s attempted forfeiture was ineffec· 
tive as a matter of law and that Boardwalk had a valid 
interest in the property. The Trial Court granted Board-
walk' s Motion for Summary Judgment and reinstated the 
Contract (R. 290). 
C. Misrepresentations of Fact. 
Boardwalk does not wish to supplement the record 
on appeal; however, Grow' s brief contains substantial 
misstatements of fact which could mislead the Court and 
which can only be refuted by producing a summary of 
recorded documents filed with the Utah County Recorder. 
These documents are summarized in the Preliminary Title 
Report, Commitment No. 079-3901, attached hereto as 
- 8 -
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Arpendix "A". The material misrepresentations made by 
Grow are as follows: 
1. Statement. 
---------
"Boardwalk ... acquired [its] 
position with constructive notice and actual knowledge of 
the default history, the recorded forfeiture notices and 
the pendency of this lawsuit." (Appellant's Brief, p. 5) 
A. Fact. No notice of forfeiture was ever 
recorded. (See, Appendix A.) 
B. Fact. No Lis Pendens was recorded 
until November 9, 1978, nearly two months after Boardwalk 
purchased its interest in the property. (See, Appendix 
"A", Schedule B, Item 12.) 
c. Fact. The record is devoid of any 
evidence showing that Boardwalk had knowledge of the 
forfeiture notices or default history. 
2. Statement. "After 10 months marked only by 
two late payments, non-payment of taxes, bad checks, four 
payments not made at all ••• Euyers tendered to Appellant 
a cashier's check in the amount of $7,394.60. (Appel-
lant's Brief, p. 5.) 
Fact. During the 10-month time frame 
referred to by Appellant, nine payments were due and 
owing. As of April 14 1978, Marwick submitted and Grow 
accepted checks totalling $8,739.20, representing the five 
- 9 -
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payments payable pursuant to Paragraph 3 of 
the Contract in the amount of $1, 74 7. 44 each (R. 122, R, 
installment 
94). On or about August 22, 1978, in response to a Notice 
of Default, Marwick tendered to Grow a Cashier's Check in 
the amount of $7, 394. 60, representing four monthly in-
stallment payments, together with interest and an attar-
ney's fee in the amount of $300.00. Gr ow' s own documents 
clearly demonstrate that he accepted more than "two late 
payments". 
3. Statement. "On July 18, 1978, Appellant 
-------
filed a Complaint initiating the above-captioned action" 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 4). 
Fact. Al though this statement is techni-
cally correct, it puts the facts in a false light. The 
record reveals that this Complaint was not served upon 
Marwick until September 1, 1978, at which time R. C. 
Palmer served the Complaint, Amended Complaint and Notice 
of Forfeiture on Marwick (R. 30, 31, 32). 
4. "(A] ppellant' s Motion for 
Partial summary Judgment was denied by the Trial Court, 
the Honorable David Sam presiding, upon an express finding 
ld b Consl. dered at trial'" of 'genuine issues ... that shou e 
(R-312) (Appellant's Brief, p. 2). 
- 10 -
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Fact. The Court actually ruled that 
•genuine issues of material facts exist as to Plaintiff's 
~ that should be considered at trial" (TR-312). The 
full quote is necessary to demonstrate that the Trial 
court very carefully limited any ruling to Grow's Motion. 
No opinion was expressed as to whether Boardwalk was 
entitled to Summary Judgment. In fact Boardwalk was not 
even allowed to intervene as a party-defendant until the 
date of the hearing on Grow's Motion for summary Judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondents do not dispute the fact that Marwick 
was often dilatory in making monthly payments during 
the brief Contract term. They recognize and understand 
Grow's frustration with the payment history. However, 
Grow's frustration is not a sufficient legal basis to 
support the harsh remedy of forfeiture. Marwick timely 
tendered all delinquent payments owing on the Contract 
within the 15-day period allowed in Grow's Notice of 
Default dated August 9, 1978. Once the default was cured, 
forfeiture was not available as a remedy (Point I, infra). 
Grow based his attempted forfeiture on an inter-
pretation of Paragraph llB which would require eighteen 
percent ( 18%) interest to be paid on the entire Contract 
- 11 -
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balance in the event of a default. This interpretation haa 
the result of effectively tripling the t d 
en er necessary t: 
bring the Contract current. Grow attributes this differenc; 
to "Specifically_Implied Interest." This position 10 
untenable and the Trial Court correctly ruled that this wao 
not the clear meaning of Paragraph llB (Point III, ~). 
The Trial Court properly ruled that Grow': 
interpretation of Paragraph llB, if accepted as true, 
would impose a penalty which is unenforceable at la•. 
When broken down to its lowest common denominator, the 
amount sought by Grow was approximately 8,000% greatec 
than the actual damages obtained pursuant to the Trial 
Court's ruling which applied the eighteen percent (181 
interest rate to delinquent payments only. Under tt1E 
circumstances of this case, the damage figures sought b: 
Grow bore no relation to actual damages suffered and were 
unconscionable. As such, Grow sought a penalty which was 
unenforceable at law or in equity (Point V, infra). 
The Courts look with disfavor upon forfeitures 
and will seize upon slight circumstances to relieve' 
party from the oppression imposed by a forfeiture. The 
Courts will strictly construe a forfeiture provision 
- 12 -
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against the drafter. They will not impose a forfeiture 
unless the terms are clear and unequivocal. Clearly, the 
court will not impose a forfeiture as a result of "speci-
fically implied interest" (Point IL p. 15, infra). The 
Trial Court properly held that under these circumstances 
the remedy of forfeiture itself constituted a penalty 
which was unenforceable as a matter of equity or law 
(Point IV, infra). 
As a final point, it is the province of the 
Court to reinstate the Contract when adequate compensation 
can be made (Point II A, infra). In the present case, 
installment payments have been made and tendered to the 
Registry of the Court. In addition, Boardwalk has pur-
chased a Certificate of Deposit with Commercial Security 
Bank in the amount of $70,000 and would tender whatever 
amounts, pursuant to the direction of the Court, are 
necessary to clear the default (R. 151). Grow could 
clearly be made whole under any circumstances. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
ANY ALLEGED DEFAULT WAS TIMELY CURED 
AND FORFEITURE IS UNAVAILABLE AS A REMEDY 
It is axiomatic that the default and forfeiture 
provisions in a contract are not self-executing. The 
- 13 -
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seller must give the buyer notice of and a reasonabi, 
period to cure any alleged default. 
Utah 2d 266, 508 P.2d 532 (1973). 
LaMon t v. Evj!_l!, 1, 
The August 9, )gJt, 
Notice of Default upon which Grow of necessity must 
rel yr 
specifically allowed Marwick fifteen (15) days to cure tfi; 
default. At the time the Notice was sent, Marwick had pa1,: 
five of the nine installments owing on the Contract. Withi: 
the fifteen (15) day period, Marwick tendered to Gro• 
payment of all delinquent installments on the Contrw 
together with eighteen percent (18%) interest thereon anc 
attorney's fees in the amount of $300. Once this default 
was cured, Grow had no right to assert a forfeiture. 
I I. 
THE COURTS LOOK WITH EXTREME DISFAVOR 
UPON THE REMEDY OF FORFEITURE 
Forfeitures are "odious to the law". Morgan v. 
Sorenson, 3 Utah 2 d 4 2 8 , 2 8 6 P . 2 d 2 2 9 , 2 31 ( 19 5 5) • The 
Courts will "seize upon slight circumstances" to relieve' 
party from the oppression imposed by a forfeiture. 
Jameson v. Wurtz, 396 P.2d 68, 74 {Alaska 1964). In 
Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Norton, 9 6 u,s, 
S upreme Court addressea 234, 242 (1878), the United States 
the subject of forfeiture and held: 
- 14 -
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Forfeitures are not favored in 
the law. They are often the means of 
great oppression and injustice. And, 
where adequate compensation can be 
made, the law in many cases, and 
equity in all cases, discharges the 
forfeiture upon such compensation 
being made .... 
This Court has adopted a standard for interpret-
ing forfeiture provisions consistent with the strong 
policy stated above. A forfeiture will not be enforced 
unless the terms are "clear and unequivocal." Winge ts 
Incorporated v. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007, 
1010 (1972). The general principle that the provisions of 
a contract are construed against the drafter is strictly 
applied in a forfeiture setting. Wingets Incorporated, 
supra, at 500 P.2d 1010. In addition, an interpretation 
which provides an equitable result will be preferred over 
a harsh and inequitable one. Plain City Irrigation Co. v. 
Hooper Irrigation Co. 11 Utah 2d 188, 356 P.2d 625 (1960); 
Wingets Incorporated, supra, 500 P.2d 1010. 
This is the standard of law with which Grow 
must live when he seeks the windfalls incident to for-
feiture. Grow would have been made whole had he chosen to 
accelerate the Contract balance and to foreclose on the 
mortgage. Instead, in a Contract in existence for only 
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ten (10) months of its twenty-seven (27) year term, he 
sought to: (a) recover property which had subsequent-
ly been sold for $120,000 above the Contract 1 sa e price: 
(b) retain $75,000 representing a downpayment of twenty-
five percent (25%) of the Contract sales price; and (c) 
retain $8,739.20 representing payments accepted on the 
Contract. This results in a windfall to Grow in excess of 
$200,000. There could be no better illustration of why 
the courts have adopted such a strong policy against 
forfeiture. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PARAGRAPH llB 
APPLIED TO ONLY DELINQUENT PAYMENTS 
The threshold issue on appeal is the interpreta-
tion and application of Paragraph llB: Does the eighteen 
percent (18%) interest rate apply only to the delinquent 
installments or does it apply to the outstanding Contract 
balance? All parties submitted to the Court that the 
language of the Contract was clear and unequivocal. Grow 
and Boardwalk alternately moved and argued for summary 
judgment on these grounds (R. 65, 241, TR. 330). counsel 
for Grow stated in his argument in opposition to Board· 
walk's Motion for Summary Judgment: 
- 16 -
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Second, I would like to respond 
to defendant's argument that -the 
contract is clear on its face. I do 
believe it is clear on its face. 
It is clear that the 18 per cent 
interest applies to "all unpaid 
amounts" (TR. 330). 
The accepted principle is that the interpreta-
tion of a contract is a question of law for the Court. 
Where the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, 
summary judgment is proper. 
Al though Grow argues on ape al that the Affidavit of 
Stephen Thomas creates an issue of fact which prevents 
summary judgment, this contention blithely ignores the 
provisions of Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which requires affidavits to contain facts admissible in 
evidence. It is fundamental that parol evidence cannot be 
used to alter an unambiguous contract. Fox Film Corp. v. 
Q__g_g_~.!:1._'!'.heatre C~, 82 Utah 279, 17 P.2d 294 (1932). 
Grow alleges that Marwick was in default because 
interest at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum 
must be applied to the outstanding contract balance 
upon the occurrence of a default. Therefore, Grow was 
entitled to reject a timely tender representing four 
delinquent payments in the amount of $1,747.44 each, 
- 17 -
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together with interest thereon at eighteen percent llsi: 
per annum and attorney's fees in the amount of $300. Th~ 
theory was that even though the amount of the alleged 
delinquent payments was only $6,989.76, plus interest and 
attorney's fees, a payment of $21, 750. 36--three times th; 
"delinquent payments"--was necessary to bring the Con-
tract current (R. 95). This is the practical effect of 
Grow's application of the eighteen percent (18%) interest 
rate. 
Grow' s position ignores the express language oi 
the Contract. Paragraph llB provides as follows: 
At any time, and for whatever 
length of time, this contract may be 
delinquent or in default by buyer, for 
any reason the l~!~~~!_!:..§.!~on_all 
amQ~~~~-~~E~l~-~ndef_!his_Con!f~~ 
shall increase to 18 percent (18%) per 
annum. (Emphasis added.) 
When this provision is read in conjunction with Paragraph 
3, it becomes clear that "amounts unpaid" refers only to 
the monthly payments. Paragraph 3 provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
Said payments are to commence on 
December 1, 1977, and each subsequent 
month to be due and payable on t~e 
first day of each month. (Emphasis 
added.) 
- 18 -
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The only amounts "unpaid" under the Contract 
were the delinquent monthly payments as by definition 
those payments were the only amounts "due and payable. 11 
If Grow desired to collect eighteen percent (18%) on the 
entire contract balance, his remedy was to accelerate the 
payments and 
Paragraph 16C. 
to foreclose as a mortgage pursuant to 
However, this remedy would deny Grow the 
windfall prof it he attempts to obtain through a forfei-
ture. 
The law is clear that the written words of the 
Contract govern its interpretation. Holley v. Federal 
American Partners, 29 Utah 2d 212, 507 P.2d 381 (1973) i 
Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d 259 
(1958). The intention of the parties is to be ascertained 
in accordance with the ordinary and accepted meaning of 
the words used. Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 
163, 321 P.2d 221 (1958). The clear meaning of the words 
"amounts unpaid" is those amounts which were due and 
payable under the Contract. This is the clear meaning of 
the Contract and the interpretation that must be given. 
If Grow would have desired to collect eighteen percent 
( 18%) per annum on the outstanding contract balance, he 
could have very easily used those precise words. 
- 19 -
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Throughout the Contract, Grow uses the 1 
' anguag, 
"contract balance" when he refers to t t 1 o a principal 
outstanding in the agreement. Paragraph 8 provides l;. 
part: 
8. The Seller is given the 
option to secure, execute and maintain 
loans secured by said property of not 
to exceed the then unpaid contract 
~~!~n£~ hereunder (Emphasis 
added.) 
Paragraph 13 provides: 
13. The Buyer further agrees to 
keep all insurable buildings and 
improvements on said premises insured 
in a company acceptable to the Seller 
in the amount of not less than the 
~aid balance on this contract, 
(Emphasis added.) 
The words "contract balance" have an accepted 
and understood meaning and no doubt would have arisen had 
these terms been used. However, "unpaid amounts" has a 
different meaning and would more commonly and properly 
refer to a debt due than undue, which is the construction 
the Trial Court adopted. See, Magnolia Bldg. & Inv. iE.:. 
~_Sulzman, 57 Ohio App. 421, 14 N.E. 2d 633 (19371· 
The frailty of Grow's interpretation of the 
Contract is evidenced by his own implementation of Para· 
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graph l lE. As can be observed from a review of the "Itemi-
zation of Charges under Contract and Automatic Interest 
Adjustment Provisions of September 15, 1977 Contract" which 
was served upon Marwick with the August 9, 1978 Notice of 
Default. Grow summarizes his exorbitant interest charges 
under a heading styled, "Interest Specifically Implied" (R. 
9 s) • This curiously contradictory caption classically 
illustrates the difficulty with the argument asserted by 
Grow in this case. To be enforceable, the language of the 
Contract must be clear and unequivocal. The law will not 
allow a forfeiture based upon "implied" terms or "speci-
fically implied" interest. 
IV. 
THE INTERPRETATION URGED BY APPELLANT IMPOSES 
A PENALTY WHICH IS UNENFORCEABLE AT LAW 
A. The Doctrine of Penalty Allows Reinstatement 
of the Contract. 
This Court has specifically allowed the re-
instatement of an installment land contract upon reason-
able compensation being made to the seller. 
Timber Lakes Corporation, 567 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977). 
See also, Croft v. Jensen, 86 Utah 13, 40 P.2d 198 (1935). 
In Call a basis for reinstatement was that a forfeiture 
constituted a penalty. The Court clearly did not limit 
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the application of the doctrine of penalty to 0 1 n Y those 
amounts paid by the buyer under the Contract, but speci-
fically prevented the seller from taking the land. 
In 
reaching its decision the Court applied the penalty 
standard enunciated in Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 61, 
278 P.2d 294, 298 (1954), to wit: 
It is now established in this state 
that where a forfeiture provision 
allows an unconscionable and exorbi-
tant benefit to be retained by the 
seller which bears no reasonable 
relationship to the damages which have 
been sustained or reasonably could 
have been contemplated, it provides 
for a penalty or punitive damages 
which the courts of equity will not 
enforce. 
This Court has evaluated two factors in deter· 
mining whether a forfeiture is a penalty: 
1. Does the benefit retained by the seller bear 
a reasonable relationship to the damages actually sus· 
tained or contemplated? 
2. Is the benefit retained by the seller 
unconscionable and exorbitant? 
An analysis of these tests clearly reveals 
that the forfeiture sought by Grow is a penalty which 
courts of equity will not enforce and the Trial Court so 
held. 
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B. The Benefits Retained By Grow Bear No 
Reasonable Relationship To Actual Damages. 
The damages sustained by Grow in the event 
of default are easy to calculate. The interest rate on 
the Contract is nine and one-half percent (9-1/2%) per 
annum. Monthly payments are $1,747.44 per month. Thus, 
for each monthly payment not received, plaintiff's actual 
damages are in amount of the payment, plus an additional 
$13.83 per month attributable to interest on the amount 
unpaid. However, these damage figures are of little 
significance in the present case due to the fact that all 
delinquent monthly payments, together with interest at the 
rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum and attorney's 
fees, were tendered to Grow within the time specified by 
the August Notice of Default. 
The benefits received by Grow upon forfeiture 
are 1 i kew i se easy to calculate. Grow would retain the 
$75,000 downpayment and the $8,739.20 in monthly payments 
received on the Contract from Marwick. In addition, Grow 
would receive property with a minimum value of $400,000--
$120 ,000 more than Grow's Contract price--as evidenced by 
Marwick's Contract with Boardwalk. Thus, for a default 
which was timely cured, Grow attempts to obtain a windfall 
profit which exceeds $200,000. The $200,000 figure is 
over and above any actual damages suffered by Grow· 
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The relief sought by Grow is clearly unconscion-
able and exorbitant. This is especially true h w en Viewed 
in the light that at the time of the alleged d f 1 e au t, only 
nine monthly payments of $1,747.44 each had matured 
pursuant to the Contract, five of which had been paid 
prior to the Notice of Default and all of which were 
tendered to Grow prior to the service of the Notice of 
Forfeiture upon which Grow relies in his Amended Com-
plaint. Grow' s refusal to be compensated cannot be the 
basis for the extreme remedy of forfeiture. 
v. 
GROW'S INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH llB 
IMPOSES A PENALTY WHICH IS UNENFORCEABLE AT 
LAW OR IN EQUITY 
The remedy of forfeiture constitutes a penalty 
as discussed in Part IV, infra. In addition, Grow, 
through his interpretation of Paragraph llB, sought to 
impose another blatant penalty provision upon the Respon-
dents. He sought to increase interest on the entire 
Contract from nine and one-half percent (9-1/2%) to 
eighteen percent (18%). This interest increase is solely 
for the purpose of punishing Respondents for a default. 
The law is clear that a penalty provision in a 
contract is unenforceable. Jacobson v. Swan, supra; ~ 
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v. Armstrong, 6 Utah 2d 291, 312 P.2d 777 (1957). A 
penalty as compared to a liquidated damage sum involves a 
stipulated amount which is entirely disproportionate to 
the amount of damages actually sustained. See, Kay v. 
_!iood, 549 P.2d 709 (Utah 1976). A penalty is a sum 
inserted in a contract not as a measure of compensation 
for its breach, but rather as a punishment for default. 
22 Am. Jur. 2d, "Damages," §213. 
In the case of a contract for the payment of 
money, a stipulation to pay a fixed sum in case of default 
is a penalty and as such unenforceable. The reason being 
that damages resulting from a late payment are readily 
ascertainable--the law awards interest on the unpaid 
amount. Reed v. Armstrong, SUE.£§_, 312 P.2d 777, 778. 
When damages can easily be ascertained at the time the 
agreement is executed, it is impossible to contract for 
liquidated damages. 
As illustrated earlier, at an interest rate of 
nine and one-half percent (9-1/2%) per annum, the actual 
interest damage suffered by Grow on a delinquent monthly 
payment would be $13.80 per month ($26.20 per month with 
an eighteen percent (18%) delinquency charge). These 
damages are easy to 
additional interest 
ascertain. Grow 
penalty averaging 
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month--8,302% of 
imposed whenever 
the actual interest damage--should te 
a default in the Contract occurs. The 
only reason for the imposition of this sum is to punisr. 
Marwick for a late payment. Such a result is clearly 
unconscionable, bears no relationship to actual damages 
and is unenforceable at law or in equity. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court properly granted Boardwalk's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. All amounts owing on the 
Contract had been tendered prior to the service of a 
forfeiture notice and the default had been cured. To hold 
otherwise would have imposed a blatant penalty upon 
Respondents. 
Grow's choice of remedies clearly indicates 
his intention to obtain an unconscionable and exorbitant 
benefit which bears no relationship to actual damages. If 
Grow had desired to be compensated for his damages, he 
would have invoked the remedies of Paragraph 16C of the 
Contract allowing for the acceleration of payments and 
foreclosure as a mortgage. The only reason to impose a 
forfeiture upon Marwick and innocent third parties such as 
Boardwalk is to allow Grow to retain a substantial down· 
payment and to receive a windfall profit which exceeds 
- 26 -
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$200,000. Grow unsuccessfully urged this result upon the 
Trial Court. The Trial Court ruled that such a result was 
so unjust and oppressive, that it was not enforceable in 
equity or at law. 
If this Court finds that the Trial Court erred 
in its interpretation of Paragraph llB, the case should be 
remanded for an accounting to determine what sums were 
actually owing on the Contract. The Trial Court's deci-
sion prohibiting a forfeiture should be affirmed and 
Respondents should be given a reasonable opportunity to 
bring the Contract current. 
DATED this 31st day of March, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~x?Mud 
DAVID R. OLSEN 
Attorney for Respondent 
Boardwalk Development 
Corporation 
STEWART M. HANSON, JR. 
Attorney for Respondent 
Phoenix Development 
Corporation 
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copies 
This 
of the 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
is to certify that 
foregoing Brief of 
two true and correct 
Respondents Boardwalk 
Development Corporation and Phoenix Development Corpora-
tion were mailed postage prepaid, to Ronald R. Stanger, 
Esq., 38 North University, Provo, Utah 84601 and c. Keith 
Rooker, Esq., and Neal B. Christensen, Esq., Martineau, 
Rooker, Larsen & Kimtall, 1800 Beneficial Life Tower, Jo 
South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 31st 
day of March, 1980. 
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--·-· 
Commitment No. 079-390] <Xlg{ 
St.Paul Title 
Insurance Corporation 
ST. PAUL TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, a Missouri corporation, herein called the Com-
pany, for a valuable consider~tion, hereby commits to issue its policy ~r policies of title insurance, 
as identified in Schedule A, 1n favor of the proposed Insured named in Schedule A, as owner or 
mortgagee of the estate or interest covered hereby in the land described or referred to in Schedule 
A, upon payment of the premiums and charges therefor; all subject to provisions of Schedules 
~and Band to the Conditions and Stipulations hereof. 
This Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount 
of the policy or policies commited for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, 
ei1her at the time of the issuance of this Commitment or by subsequent endorsement. 
This Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and 
all liability and obligations hereunder shall cease and terminate THREE MONTHS after the effec-
tive date hereof or when the policy or policies committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, 
provided that the failure to issue such policy or policies is not the fault of the Company. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, ST. PAUL TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION has caused this com-
mitment to be signed and sealed by its duly authorized officers, the commitment to become valid 
when countersigned by an authorized signatory as of Effective Date shown in Schedule A. 
ST. PAUL TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION 
COUNTE,R51GNEO: " ~:.:,~:t-
·,~ 
sv -
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE 
ATTEST~ ~~CRETARY 
iP 1132.78 . ·--- -- -· ---· ·-. - -·--·- --------· ---·- ---- ~ 
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AL TA COMMITMENT - 1966 SCHEDULE A 
1. Effective date: D2cemb€r 20, 1979 ·~ 8:00 A.:·1. 
2. Policy or Policies to be issued: 
____ ALT A Owner's Policy Form A-1970 (Amended 10-17-70) 
(a) X ALTA Owner's Policy Form B-1970(Amended 10-17-70) 
Proposed Insured: 
____ ALTA Loan Policy (Amended 10-17-70) (b) __ _ 
Proposed Insured: 
Commitment l\o 
Amount 
0 
Tu lie ~t'· 5' 
., E 
Ii 
t 
p 
p 
p 
l 
3. The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this Commitment and covered herein iii : 
Fee Sirrple I 
4. Title to the __ f~eeee.-.::.S.l.l~..,,..,..1e..._ ________ estate or interest in said land is at the effectiv1~: 
vested in: I 
ARIEL R. DWIS and OOrorHY JFAN HAHDIN3 ~VIS, his wife, as joint tencnts a~ , 
tenants in c:anrron, with full rights of survivorship. 
5. The land referred to in this Commitment is situated in the __ -t=Co;ei;U1"1fltf"tsvy~---of __ l:JH+t'nlal'~, -
State of ____ +Jt~r----------, and is described as follows: 
See Exhibit "/!." 
Schedule A consists of ___ pages. 
44-009 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EXHIBIT "A" 
l)Xr'l2ncin:J 1299. 77 feet North alo1"X3 secticn lire c_md 893.~9 feet West perpendicular to 
section line fran the East qua~ter oorner of Section Section 36, 'Ib-,..nship 6 South, Range • 
't<~rast, Salt Lake Base an::l Meridian; thence &:>uth 1°15' West 130.0 feet; thence &:>uth .4o15 ,. 
r t 124.00 feet; thence North~sterly 336 feet, rrore or less along the arc of a spiral tc 
: right which is concentric with and 80 feet radially distant northeasterly fran a 
i:ortion of a 600 foot ten chord. spiral for a 10°00' curve (Note: Tangent to said spiral 
int of beginnin:i bears approxl..11\ately North 46°45' West) to a point 80 feet 
fO rpendicularly distan~ Northeasterly from the center line Of said North round traffic 
lanes at Engineer Station 217+42.46; thence North 36°30' West 415 feet, more or less to 
said easterly railroad right of way line; thence North 4°53' East 223. 7 feet; thence' Soutl 
39 003 • East 722. 59 feet alo1"X3 southerly boundary of BYU property to the place of 
reg inning • 
AfSJ ~AS: 
BegiMing co the Nort;heas~erly 7ight of way line of a Utah State Expressway at Right of t\c 
1'\0rker 217+42.46, said point beil'X3 West 1116.83 feet and North 1281.28 feet fran the East 
i11 QJarter rorner of Section 36, 'Ibwnship 6 E:outh, Pange 2 Ea.st, Salt Lake Bas.: and Meridian; 
t~ence North 36°30' West alo1"X3 said right of wey line 415.66 feet to the East right cf wai-
line of the Rio Grande Pailroad; thence North 4°09' East along said railroad right .of way 
223.70 feet; thence &:>uth 39°03' East alol'X3 the &:>utherly boundary of the BYU property 
iie~722.59 feet; thence South 1°15' V.est 130.00 feet; theno~ &:>uth 4°15' West 131.26 feet to ' 
roint on the Northeasterly right of wey lire of a Utah State Expressway; thence alO:;'l3 the 
a~ ~re of a spiral curve to the right 336. 00 feet, oore or less, the said cutve being . 
cmcentric with and 80 feet radially distant, Northeasterly fran a porticn of a 600 foot 
ten chord spiral for a 10°00' curve t.'1e long chord of -,..tiich bears N::irth 38°38' West 338.95 
feet to r..oint of beg inning. 
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---~ 
--ALTA COMMITMENT - 1966 
SCHEDULE B-11 
(EXCEPTIONS) Commitment No. [ -~ 
Schedule B of the policy p r · b · d · . 9, 
. or o 1c1es to e issue will contain exceptions to the f II · 
are disposed of to the satisfaction of the Company: 0 owing rnattersunif.: 
1. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters if any created fi . 
rec.ords or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof b'ut prio; to the dat1rs\appea11niin:·. 
quires for value of record the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered b th' ect e P'. 0Posedl· 
Y is 0 mm1tmen1. 
2. (A) Rights of dower, curtesy, homestead or other marital rights of spouse if any f ... (B) Any 1· · h t 1· f · b ' • 0 any md1v1d··· 1en, or rig t o 1en, or services, la or, or material heretofore or hereafter f · h d. '' 110. 
and not shown by the public records. (C) Survey: Any encroachments measuremenu/nis e im~ 
facts which a correct survey of the premises would show. (D) Easeme~ts or cla· sf, partywi1:1, 
by th bl' d (E) R' h . , ims o easemenur 
e pu 1c recor s. 1g ts or claims of parties in possession not shown by the bl' ' pu 1c record1. 
3. All assessments and taxes for the year 19----+9- and all subsequent years. Taxes f 
de . . ~~~ 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
are lmquent in the arrount of $1,372. 78, plus penalty and interest. Tax~ 
the year 1978 a.rd 1977 have been paid. Serial Nof 1495-18-D. 
Notice of Existing Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated October 8, 1976 lfk' 11• 
ARIEL R. DA'IIS gives notire of his interest in an::l to said property u/w~t 
unrecorded Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated October 8, 1976, by and retl" 
DAVID GRCW, as Seller, and ARIEL R. D.Z\VIS, as Buyer. Said Notio= recorded• 
Entry No. 26547, in B::ck 1505, at Page 50 and re-recorded October 28, 19i6:; 
Entry No. 27909, in Book 1507, at Page 606, Utah County Recorder's Office. 
tbtice of Existing Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated January 20, 1978, lf.t 
MARI-ITO< DEVEI.OH·lENT, INC., a corporation, DANIEL R. SCXJIH\'ITO<, and STERLIN: 
MARI'EIL, jointly and severally give rotice of their interest in and to said 12. 
property by way of an unrecorded Uniform Real Estat.Ee Contrar.t, dated Ccto!:er. 
1977, by and between DAVID S. GIO'l, as Sellers, and MARWICK CEVELOPMEN!', N 
corporation, DANIEL R. SCU'IHlaCK, and STERLIN:; MARI'ELL, jointly ard severall; 
Buyers. Said Notice recorded January 25, 1978, as Entry N:). 3174, in ll:xlkli 
Page 408, Utah County Recorder's Office. 
tbtice of Existing Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated September 18, 1978,'( 
EOARJ:WA.U< DEVELOPMENI' CORP. give notia: of their interest in an::l to said P~" 
by way of an unrecorded Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated September 18, b 
am between MARI-ITO< DEVELOPMENI', IllC., as Sellers, and BOARIX'iAIK DEVELOFNEi.13. 
as Buyers. Said Notice recorded Septerrber 20, 1978, as Entry tb. 38015, ID' 
1682, at Page 456, Utah Cow1ty Recorder's Office. 
N:Jtice of Existi~g Unifoi:m ~al Esta~e Contract, .dated June 2, 1978, ~re~l 
JENSEN gives notice of his interest in an::l to said property by w~N'.i ii:. 4· 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated June 2, 1978, by and between . tio:l!t 
and Ql';NIEL SCUIHWICK, as Sellers, and ALAN JENSm, as Buyers. Said 1-bt ~ 
June 7, 1978, as Entry N::l. 22119, in Ecok 1652, at Page 794, Utah C.OunY 
Office. 
78 ...ti rein (Th'l1i'Fl· 8. Notice of Interest in Real Property, dated November 8, 19 '. e . ani :1 
GOLDrn WEST, INC., a Utah Corporatim gives notice of their in~~re~t ~~ti 
property by way of an Sales agency o:mtract, ~ated Jul::( l~' 1~roke/ an:i fL\.1.: 
CE!ITVRY 21 GJLDEN WEST, INC., a Utah Corporation, as llstin:J a,,ner. Saii' 
DEVELOPMENI' Q)RP. ~IEL R. SXJ'IH\'iIQl and STERLil\'G 1·1'RI'ELL 1 as 28 Cl' 
recorded N::rJember
1 
9, 1978, as Entry tb. 45239, in !3c.Ok 1696, at Page ' 
Countv Fecorder's Office. ilL.J 
Schedule B-11 consists of __ pages. i?jt~lfsc.1 
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g, .:..ssignm=nt of Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated April 4, 1979, wherein DA.'UEL R. 
SCG'Y.MICK, Assignor, assigns, transfers am .conveys his interest in am to the 
subject property by way of an unrecorded Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated 
ectorer 18, 197? I by a.rd between DAVID s. Gro\, as Seller, am MAIMIQ< DEVEWPMENT 
INC., a orporation, rn.i.'UEL R. 9'.XJ'lliWICK and STERLING MARI'EIL, jointly and 
severally, as Buyer, ~ REPL'RLIC INVES'IMENTS, as Assignee. Said Assignment of 
Contract recorded April 4, 1979, as Entry fob. 12557, in Book 1732, at Page 876, 
Utah county Recorder's Office. 
1110• Assignment of ~niform Real Es tat:. et:>ntract, dated. April 1, 1979, wherein DANIEL R. 
; SCUilJWICK, Assignor, as to an una1v1ded one-half interest, assigns, transfers a.rd 
conveys his interest in and to the subject property by way of an unrecorded uniform 
Real Estate Contract, dated September 16, 1977, by am between DAVID S. GRCH, as 
Seller, and ~"ICK WIEI.DPMENI', INC. , and Dl\NIEL R. S'.XJIHWICK and STERLING 
MARl'filL, as Buyer, to PHOENIX DEVEIDPMENI' CORPORATICN, as Assignee. Said 
Assignment of Contract recorded Apri~ 6, 1979, as Entry fob. 12917, in Book 1733, at 
page 537, Utah County Recorder's Office. 
11. Assignment of Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated September 12, 1979, wherein 
STERLIN3 MARI'ELL, MARI'EIL, of Orem, Utah County, utal-i, Assignor, assigns, transfers 
and ronveys his interest in and to the subject property by way of an unrecorded 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated O:tober 18, 1977, by a.rd between DAVID s. Gro\', 
as Sellec, and MAR~·IICK WIEI.DPMENT, INC., a ro~ration, caniel R. Southwick and 
Sterling Martell, jointly a.rd severally, as Buyer, to DAVID MCKELL, MCKELL of 
Provo, Utah County, Utah, as Assignee. Said Assignment of Contract recorded 
September 12, 1979, as Entry N::J. 35992, in Boak 1776, at Page 884, Utah County 
Recorder's Office. 
12. :btice of Li:: Pendens, by and between DAVID s. G?.:M, as Plaintiff vs. MMh"ICK 
DE:'Tc.LOP.·!a'I', INC. I a corporation, DANIEL R. SCXJIB\VIC:i<; STERLIN3 MARI'ELL; JOHN OOE 
I, II, and III; and JANE roE I, II, and III; and all known heirs, devisees, 
legatees, creditors, successors an::l assigns of said named I:efendants, or any of 
the.'ll in case they or any of them, are deceased; and all other persons unknown 
clai.mirg any right, title, interest in or lien or cloud upoo the real property 
described in Plaintiff's Complaint adverse to the Plaintiff's a..nership. Said 
t·btice of Lis Pendens recorded November 9, 1978, as Entry It>. 45264, in Boak 1696, 
at Page 67, Utah County Recorder's Off ice. 
: 13. lbtice of Lis Pendens, by ard between Dl\VID S. GIOv, Plaintiff, vs. MA~'ICT< 
' DE'lEU)R!E:lT, me., et al., as D=fendants. Said Notice of Lien recorded September 
19, 1979, as Entrv No. 37028, in Bcok 1778, at Page 741, Utah County Recorder's 
Office. • 
1' 
~ 14. Subject to the effects of that certain judgment wherein there was a determinatioi"l 
~ of existing property interest in a.rd to real property •. (Judgment dated August 29, 
~ 1979, recorded September 9, 1979, as oxket No. 49549, in B::lok 28, at Page M-6, 
lltah County Clerk's Office.) 
IDI'E: 'Ihe following names have l::een checked for judgments: 
1. Sterling Martell 
2. I:aniel R. Southwick 
3. Phoenix D=velop.nent 
4 · D::vid S. Grow 
5. Marwick D=velopnent 
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tb unsatisfied judgments have teen filed in the past eight years, D:G;fYr ,,_, 
fDLI.DirIN:;: ,, 
Judgrnen t against DAVID GFCW, STEVEN L. GR::M, et al KING HENRY APARI'ME!IIS .. 
vs. STATE TAX CCT·lMISSICN, as Creditor. Creditor awarded $43.91, plllS ~;~ 
interest. Said Judgment recorded August 14, 1979, c.s COcket tb. A-27-2ai"': 
28, at Page G-3, Utah County Clerk's Office. " 
TSC-100:12n7 
..I 
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Conditions and Stipulations 
1. The term mortgage, when used herein, shall include deed of trust, trust deed, or other 
security instrument. 
2. If the proposed Insured has or acquires actual knowledge of any defect, lien, encum-
brance, adverse claim or other matter affecting the estate or interest or mortgage thereon 
covered by this Commitment other than those shown in Schedule B hereof, and shall 
fail to disclose such knowledge to the Company in writing, the Company shall be 
relieved from liability for any loss or damage resulting from any act of reliance hereon 
to the extent the Company is prejudiced by failure to so disclose such knowledge. If 
the proposed Insured shall disclose such knowledge to the Company, or if the Company 
otherwise acquires actual knowledge of any such defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse 
claim or other matter, the Company at its option may amend Schedule B of this Com-
mitment accordingly, but such amendment shall not relieve the Company from liabil· 
ity previously incurred pursuant to Paragraph 3 of these Conditions and Stipulations. 
3. Liability of the Company under this Commitment shall be only to the named proposed 
Insured and such parties included under the definition of Insured in the form of policy 
or policies committed for and only for actual loss incurred in reliance hereon in under-
taking in good faith (a) to comply with the requirements hereof, or (b) to eliminate 
exceptions shown in Schedule B, or (c) to acquire or create the estate or interest or 
mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment. In no event shall such liability exceed 
the amount stated in Schedule A for the policy or policies committed for and such 
liability is subject to the insuring provisions, the Conditions and Stipulations, and the 
Exclusions from Coverage of the form of policy or policies committed for in favor of 
the proposed Insured which are hereby incorporated by reference and are made a part 
of this Commitment except as expressly modified herein. 
4. Any action or actions or rights of action that the proposed Insured may have or may 
bring against the Company arising out of the status of the title to the estate or interest 
or the status of the mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment must be based on 
and are subject to the provisions of this Commitment. 
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